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Abstract  
This paper introduces the concept of safety-related (SR) uncertainty and the methodology to measure SR 
uncertainty. SR uncertainty is concerned with the effect of parameter uncertainty on the uncertainty of 
system unsafety (defined with respect to achieved safety integrity level), which is in direct contrast to the 
effect on overall system uncertainty. The properties of SR uncertainty are discussed and its significance in 
analyzing safety systems is highlighted. The conventional global sensitivity analysis (GSA) to handle 
overall uncertainty is inappropriate when SR uncertainty is of interest.  We present and discuss four 
methods to measure SR uncertainty. Three examples are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
proposed methods in comparison with GSA.  
Keywords: Safety system; Importance measure; Safety-related uncertainty; Global sensitivity analysis; 
Safety integrity level 
 
1. Introduction 
Dealing with uncertainty is among the major challenges for quantitative risk assessment [1, 2]. The 
knowledge of how parameter uncertainty influences the uncertainty in output is indispensible to direct the 
limited resources to the most influential parameters in terms of reducing uncertainty and improving system 
safety [3]. Global sensitivity analysis (GSA) [1, 4-6] is a useful technology to determine which parameters 
influence output the most when uncertainty in the parameters is propagated through the model. It can 
identify critical parameters and rank parameters with respect to reliability and risk [4]. Borgonovo [7] 
classified the GSA-based measures into three categories: 1) nonparametric techniques [8], 2) variance-
based importance measures [9] and 3) moment-independent sensitivity indicators [3]. Essentially, GSA 
quantifies the contribution by individual parameters to the overall output uncertainty [10]. However, in the 
context of safety systems, we may be more interested in how the parameter uncertainty affects output 
uncertainty that is relevant to system safety (or equivalently, unsafety) [11], as discussed subsequently. 
Current techniques are exclusively focused on overall uncertainty, and safety-related (SR) uncertainty has 
largely been under-explored. 
Safety systems are widely used in industry to reduce or prevent risk [11-13]. International standards like 
IEC 61508 [14] require especially for high safety applications a quantification of the achieved safety. In 
order to comply with this standard, the safety system has to be quantified to the “safety integrity level” 
(SIL). The IEC61508 standard discerns four SILs as shown in Table 1 [14]. The achieved SIL of a safety 
system can be obtained by calculating the average probability of failure on demand or safety probability of 
a dangerous failure per hour. However, in practice, uncertainty in model and/or parameters results in a 
probability distribution of system failure covering more than one SIL. This study is mainly focused on 
uncertainty in parameters, and thus model uncertainty is not discussed further. Fig. 1 shows a high integrity 
pressure protection system studied by Rouvroye [11], where the distribution of the failure probability 
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encloses SIL1, SIL2 and SIL3 because of parameter uncertainty. Assume that pSILx is the upper bound 
under safety integrity level x (x=1, 2, 3, 4). Table 1 gives pSIL1 = 10
-1
, pSIL2 = 10
-2
, pSIL3 = 10
-3 
and pSIL4 = 10
-4
 
for the low demand mode of system operation. For example, if SIL2 is required, the distribution in Fig. 1 
can be divided into two parts. The safety part corresponds to failure probability Y >= pSIL2 and unsafety 
refers to the region where Y < pSIL2. Clearly, a small region of unsafety is desired for the safety system. In 
this paper, we consider how the parameter uncertainty influences the uncertainty of the SIL (equivalently 
the unsafety region as given in Fig. 1). This influence, once properly quantified, is an important indicator to 
rank the importance of system parameters in terms of achieved integrity. 
 
Table 1 Safety integrity levels according to the IEC 61508 standard. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 The distribution of probability of failure on demand. 
  
As GSA techniques focus on the overall uncertainty of the model output, they are not suitable to measure 
SR uncertainty. In this work, we analyze how this issue can be addressed. We discuss the relationship 
between these two types of uncertainty, and propose four methods to handle SR uncertainty from different 
perspectives. The first method is based on the principle of reduction in the SR uncertainty if uncertainty in 
one parameter is eliminated. The second method evaluates the mean effect of parameter uncertainty on SR 
uncertainty. The third method assesses the rate of change in system unsafety by changing parameter 
uncertainty. The fourth method identifies which parameter’s uncertainty influences the SR uncertainty the 
most in the view of variance. The proposed methods are applied to three systems models in comparison 
with GSA. The results highlight the need of the proposed measures when SR uncertainty is considered.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews GSA and discusses the 
difference between overall uncertainty and SR uncertainty. Section 3 proposes four methods to measure the 
SR uncertainty. In Section 4, three examples are provided to illustrate the properties of the proposed 
methods when compared with GSA indicators.  Section 5 concludes the paper.  
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2. Overall uncertainty and safety-related uncertainty 
2.1. Assessing overall uncertainty through global sensitivity analysis 
Let Y be the output of a system model g(X) and X = (X1, X2,…,Xn) be a set of input parameters. The 
overall uncertainty links the uncertainty about Xi with the uncertainty about Y, which encloses the entire 
distribution of the model output Y [10]. GSA is an effective tool to assess the overall uncertainty due to 
parameter uncertainty. GSA provides a certain measure that quantifies the impact of parameters on system 
output. Various measures have been proposed in the literature [1, 3, 15, 16] and they may be classified into 
three categories [7]: 1) Non-parametric techniques; 2) Variance-based importance measure; and 3) 
Moment-independent sensitivity indicators.   
The first category is based on non-parametric techniques that usually depend on the system model. For 
example, regression-based methods are appropriate when the system output is a linear function of the 
inputs [1]. These model-dependent methods are not discussed further; more details may be found in [1, 15, 
16]. 
The variance-based importance measures consider the entire range of variation of the parameter and 
identify the contribution of individual parameters and their interactions. The variance-based measures are 
independent of the system model under study. A widely used measure due to Iman and Hora [9, 17] is 
    IH [ ]i i iV Y E V Y X V E Y X           (1) 
where V[Y] is the variance of the model output Y, and E{V[Y|Xi]} is the conditional expectation of the 
variance of Y with respect to the i-th parameter Xi. IHi quantifies the expected reduction in output variance 
if uncertainty in Xi is eliminated. The ranking of the importance of parameters based on IHi is the same as 
that based on the first order sensitivity index [18]. Clearly, the variance-based methods rely on a specific 
moment of the output distribution. 
The third category of GSA is the moment-independent sensitivity indicators. These measures investigate 
the influence of parameter uncertainty on the entire output distribution without reference to a specific 
moment of the output [1]. Among this category, CHTi and i  are two important measures introduced by 
Chun et al. [3] and Borgonovo [1], respectively. The measure CHTi is defined by 
 
 
1/2
1
2
0
[ ]
CHT
( )
i
t t
i
P P dt
E Y



 (2) 
where i
tP  is the t-th quantile of a cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the “base case”, tP is the t-th 
quantile of a CDF for the “sensitivity case” and E(Y) is the mean of output distribution for the “base case”. 
The base case refers to the situation where the output distribution ( )Yf y  is obtained with all the parameter 
distributions being set to their nominal distributions, whereas in the sensitivity case the output distribution 
| ( )iY Xf y is obtained by changing the distribution of parameter iX  according to a certain strategy [3]. CHTi 
is essentially the metric distance in terms of quantiles between the base and sensitivity cases.  
The measure i  is defined by 
  
1
[ ]
2 i
i X iE s X   (3) 
with 
      | dii Y Y Xs X f y f y y   (4) 
where fY(y) is the density function of Y and  | iY Xf y  is the conditional density function of Y given Xi. This 
measure denotes the expected shift between the distribution of output Y and conditional distribution of 
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output Y given Xi. The main difference the two measures is that CHTi requires to hypothesize a “sensitivity 
case” as discussed previously, while 
i does not.  
Subsequently, the measures of IHi and i  will be used to assess overall system uncertainty, against 
which the proposed SR uncertainty measures will be compared.  
 
2.2. Safety-related uncertainty 
When we consider safety systems, besides the overall uncertainty we are also interested in SR 
uncertainty, i.e. how the achieved safety level is affected by parameter uncertainty. For example, safety 
systems that need to comply with the IEC 61508 should reach a certain SIL and thus be considered safe 
(otherwise they are considered unsafe). Usually, a point estimate (i.e. average) of the probability of failure 
on demand (or safety probability of a dangerous failure per hour) is used to judge whether the system 
achieves the required SIL. However, when the uncertainty of parameters is considered, the probability of 
failure on demand itself becomes a random variable, and its distribution may enclose more than one SIL. 
For example in Fig. 1, if SIL-2 is the required safety level, the region to the right of the dashed line (i.e. the 
failure probability Y > pSIL2) is considered unsafety. For safety systems, a minimal unsafety region is 
desired. The primary objective of this paper is to identify which parameter influences the unsafety region 
the most. The uncertainty of the unsafety region due to parameter uncertainty is called SR uncertainty.  
 
  
Fig.2 The density  Yf y (solid) and conditional density  | i iY X xf y  (dashed). 
 
Fig. 2 illustrates the fundamental concept of SR uncertainty. The i  measure from GSA (Eq.(3)) 
calculates the overall difference between  Yf y  and  | i iY X xf y  (the shaded area in Fig. 2 (a)), while the 
SR uncertainty concerns with the change of unsafety probability when the uncertainty in Xi is eliminated. 
As shown in Fig. 2 (b), if given i iX x
 , the size of conditional unsafety region 
| i iY X x
S   equals to the 
original unsafety region, we say that the parameter iX  in the value ix
  has no contribution to SR 
uncertainty. Moreover, it is possible that SR uncertainty will increase by reducing the uncertainty of certain 
parameters, which is impossible for overall uncertainty. These parameters have adverse effect on reducing 
SR uncertainty and should be ranked as the least important to SR uncertainty, since the existence of their 
uncertainty is desired for reduced system unsafety. Therefore, no effort may be needed to reduce these 
parameters’ uncertainty.  
 
2.3. Overall uncertainty and SR uncertainty may rank the importance of parameters 
differently 
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Since GSA is focused on the overall uncertainty while SR uncertainty is only concerned with the 
uncertainty that is directly related to achieved safety, these two methods may differ in ranking the 
importance of parameters.  Fig. 3 illustrates an example where two parameters, X1 and X2, are considered.  
 
 
Fig.3 The density  Yf y and conditional density  | i iY X xf y , i = 1,2. (a)(b): overall uncertainty; (c)(d): SR 
uncertainty. 
 
In Fig. 3, the shaded area 
| i iY X x
S   is the shift between the two densities  Yf y  and  | i iY X xf y , i=1,2. 
A comparison between Fig. 3(a) and (b) show 
1 1 2 2| |Y X x Y X x
S S      , and the measure by Borgonovo [1] 
indicates 1 2  , i.e. 2X  is more influential than 1X . However, the SR uncertainty measure, as shown in 
Fig. 3(c) and (d), shows 
1 1 2 2| |Y X x Y X x
S S     , i.e. the shift between  Yf y and  1 1|Y X xf y  is greater than 
the shift between  Yf y and  
2 2|Y X x
f y  with regard to system unsafety. Hence, 1X  is concluded to be 
more influential than 2X . Two completely opposite results may be obtained, depending on either overall 
uncertainty or SR uncertainty is considered. In practice, GSA techniques become inappropriate when SR 
uncertainty is of concern. Next, the methods to quantify the SR uncertainty are proposed. 
 
3. Safety-related uncertainty measures 
The relevant notations used in this paper are as follows. 
(1) .  1 2, , ,
n
nX X X X R  is the set of uncertain input parameters. 
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(2).    , : nY g X g X E R R    is the function relationship between output Y and input 
parameters X , i.e. the known system model. 
(3).  1 2, , , nx x x x  is a realization of X . 
(4).  Xf x  is the joint density of X . 
(5).  
iX i
f x  is the marginal density of 
ix . 
(6). ( )Yf y  is the density function of the model output Y. 
(7). ( )
iY X
f y  is the conditional density of Y given one parameter Xi being fixed. 
(8). pSILx is the upper bound under safety integrity level x (x=1, 2, 3, 4). Table 1 gives pSIL1=10
-1
, 
pSIL2=10
-2
, pSIL3=10
-3 
and pSIL4=10
-4
 for the low demand mode of system operation. 
 
3.1. Method 1 
Assume that SILx is the required safety integrity level. Let S be the failure probability of safety system 
above pSILx: 
  
SILx
Y Y
p
S f y dy

   (5) 
Further, let 
| i iY X x
S   be the failure probability of safety system above pSILx given i iX x
 :  
  
| |i i i iSILx
Y X x Y X xp
S f y dy 

 
   (6) 
Then, the reduction of SR uncertainty due to observing the i-th parameter may be measured by: 
 
|
M1 i i
Y Y X x
i
Y
S S
S


  (7) 
In Eq.(7), 
ix
  may simply be taken as the expected value of Xi, i.e. ix
 =E(Xi). Note that when considering 
SR uncertainty, the safety system should satisfy the required SILx (i.e. E[Y]  pSILx). Method 1 quantifies 
the change in the probability of unsafety if the uncertainty in Xi is eliminated.  
Since 
YS  and | i iY X x
S   are the failure probabilities, [0,1]YS   and | [0,1]i iY X x
S   , and thus M1i takes 
values in (-∞,1]. M1i=1 means complete reduction of the system unsafety (the shaded area in Fig. 4(a)) if 
the uncertainty in Xi is eliminated and M1i=0 indicates that the uncertainty of Xi has no effect on the system 
unsafety. In contrast, M1i< 0 denotes increase in the system unsafety (the shaded area in Fig. 4(b)) if the 
uncertainty in Xi is eliminated. In this case, we may prefer to keep the existing uncertainty in Xi. Hence, the 
parameter with the highest M1i value is ranked as the most influential as far as reducing unsafety 
probability is concerned. 
One natural extension of M1i is to replace | i iY X x
S   by the expectation of | iY XS  with respect to Xi, giving 
rise to a new measure 'M1i : 
 
   |
|'
[ ]
M1
i i
SILx i
Y X i Y X i
p Y Y X
i
Y Y
S f x f y dydx S E S
S S

 
 
 
 (8) 
In analogous to M1i, 
'M1i  takes values in (- ,1] and its magnitude quantifies the influence of parameter 
uncertainty on the system unsafety. The sign of 'M1i  denotes the “direction” of the influence, also similar 
to M1i. Therefore, the parameter with the highest 
'M1i  value is ranked as the most influential with regard to 
SR uncertainty.  
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Fig.4 The reduction in the probability of unsafety with eliminated uncertainty in Xi. 
 
3.2. Method 2 
The definition of Method 2 is given by   
 
( )
M2
( )
i Y
i
Y i
V X S
S V X



 (9) 
This method measures the rate of change in system unsafety due to the change in the variance of Xi. If 
M2 0i  , reducing the uncertainty of Xi will reduce system unsafety YS . On the contrary, a negative M2i 
suggests an increase of system unsafety by reducing the uncertainty of Xi. Therefore, the parameter with the 
highest M2i value is ranked as the most influential with regard to SR uncertainty. 
 
3.3. Method 3 
The third method proposed in this paper is a variance-based measure, and the definition is given by 
 
|( )
M3 ( )
( )
iY X
i i
i
V S
V X
V X



 (10) 
where |( )iY XV S  is variance of system unsafety with respect to Xi. This method measures the change in the 
variance of system unsafety due to the change in the variance of Xi. It should be noted that M3i measures 
the absolute change in the variance of system unsafety by varying the uncertainty in Xi, while M2i 
measures the relative change in system unsafety by changing the uncertainty in Xi. If M3 0i   (or 
M3 0i  ), the reduction in uncertainty of Xi will decrease (or increase) the uncertainty of YS . Thus, the 
parameter with the largest M3i value poses the greatest influence on the uncertainty of YS .  
 
3.4. Numerical computation 
The proposed SR uncertainty measures are computed using Monte Carlo (MC) simulation. For each 
simulation run, m MC samples are generated from the distribution of input parameters  Xf x , based on 
which the output distribution ( )Yf y , and thus the system unsafety in Eq.(5) can be approximated. To 
calculate 
| i iY X x
S  , we may replace the i-th parameter of all the m samples by E(Xi), followed by the 
computation of the conditional output distribution and thus its integration as in Eq.(6). Then, M1i can be 
obtained for each input parameter. Similar procedure can be used for obtaining 'M1i . 
The partial derivatives in Methods 2 and 3 are approximated by finite difference. Specifically, the 
variance of Xi is reduced by a small amount (and denoted by 
'
iX ): 
 '( ) ( ) ( )i i iV X V X V X   (11) 
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and the measures are calculated as follows: 
 
'( ) ( )
M2
( ) ( )
Yi iY Y
i
Y i Y i
S SV X V XS
S V X S V X

 

  (12) 
 
'|| |
( ) ( )( )
M3 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
ii i
Y XY X Y X
i i i
i i
V S V SV S
V X V X
V X V X

 

 (13) 
where 'YS  and '|( )iY X
V S  are respectively system unsafety and the variance of system unsafety with the 
variance of Xi being reduced by 100α% .  
Normally, in finite-difference method where the function to be differentiated is deterministic, a small 
value for α (yet not small enough to be comparable with the computer’s numeric precision) is desired, such 
as 0.001. However, Eqs. (12) and (13) are stochastic functions, and thus using such a small α is numerically 
unstable unless an extremely large number of MC samples are used. In this study, a relatively large value 
α=0.2 is adopted based on empirical study, which will be further discussed along with the results in the next 
section.  
In addition, the sample size is taken as m=10000. To ensure the robustness of the MC method, N=100 
replicated simulations are performed and the average values of the importance measures are reported. The 
choice of these settings gives reliable results, and it is consistent with those reported in the literature [19]. 
 
4. Examples  
Three examples are selected to demonstrate the application of the proposed methods, including two 
simple models and a two-out-of-three system.  
 
4.1. Example 1: a simple example for illustration 
To understand the relationship between the proposed methods and GSA, consider a simple example 
given below  
  1 2 11Y X X   (14) 
where the uncertainty of X1 and X2 are given by the following probability density function: 
    
1 1 1
, 2,16Xf x Beta x  (15) 
    
2 2 2
,16,2Xf x Beta x  (16) 
The distributions of X1 and X2 are positively and negatively skewed respectively as shown in Fig. 5. The 
corresponding distribution of model output Y is shown in Fig. 6. The statistical properties of the parameters 
and the model output are summarized in Table 2. 
 
 
Fig.5 The distribution of parameters: (a) X1; (b) X2. 
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Fig.6 The distribution of model output Y. 
 
Table 2 Statistical properties of the parameters and the model output. 
 
 
Assume that the required SIL is level 1 and the failure probability greater than pSIL1=10
-1
 is considered 
unsafe. Table 3 shows the results of M2i and M3i when varying the parameter α in the finite difference 
method (Eqs. (12)(13)). The last column in the table refers to the percentage that the rankings (from N=100 
repeated MC simulations) are consistent with the final ranking (from the average of these 100 repetitions). 
A larger percentage indicates a more stable calculation. Clearly, when a small α (0.001 or 0.01) is used, 
finite difference does not give stable approximation to the partial derivatives. This phenomenon can be 
rectified, in theory, by using a very large number of MC samples. Nevertheless, it is practically more 
desirable to choose a relatively large α to achieve reasonable calculation while maintaining a low 
computational cost. Based on the results in Table 3, α=0.2 appears to be a good choice and is adopted for 
this example. Furthermore, the same procedure has been carried out for all the three examples presented in 
this paper and the results all supported the choice of α=0.2 (details not reported for the rest two examples 
for the sake of conciseness).  
 
Table 3 SR uncertainty measures (M2i and M3i) calculated by varying α. 
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Besides the four proposed measures, two GSA indicators (   and IH) are also calculated and the results 
are shown in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Uncertainty importance measures and their ranking (bracketed, “E” refers to equal ranking). 
 
 
Table 4 shows that X1 and X2 are equally important according to i and IHi. The two GSA measures are 
unable to distinguish the importance of the two parameters, so is the proposed 'M1i  measure. However, M1i, 
M2i and M3i suggest that X1 is more influential than X2 with regard to SR uncertainty. M1i indicates that if 
the uncertainty of X1 (X2) is eliminated, the system unsafety region is reduced by 90% (34%). M2i denotes  
higher relative reduction of system unsafety by reducing the variance of X1 (0.42) than that by reducing the 
variance of X2 (0.29).  M3i also supports the conclusion that X1 is more important than X2 in the view of SR 
uncertainty. Note that 'M1i  cannot distinguish X1 and X2 in this example because  | iY Y XS E S .  
The importance ranking may be potentially used to improve the system safety by reducing parameter 
uncertainty. Following the ranking based on SR uncertainty, the uncertainty of X1 may be reduced. As an 
example, suppose that the standard deviation of X1 is reduced from 0.72×10
-1
 to 0.23×10
-1
, and the original 
and reduced distribution of model output Y are shown in Fig. 7(a). For comparison, we may choose to 
reduce the standard deviation of X2 from 0.72×10
-1
 to 0.23×10
-1
 instead of changing that of X1, and the 
original and reduced distribution of model output Y are shown in Fig. 7(b).  
 
 
Fig.7 The distribution of model output Y with reduced uncertainty of (a) X1, (b) X2. 
 
As shown in Fig. 7(a), the white and blue bars compose the original distribution of model output Y, while 
the white and green bars represent the distribution of Y with reduced uncertainty of X1. The reduced SR 
uncertainty in case 1 is 1S (blue bars on the right of the dashed line in Fig. 7(a)). Similarly, 2S  in Fig. 
7(b) is the reduced unsafety probability in case 2. Clearly 1 2S S   , suggesting that reducing the 
uncertainty in X1 is more effective than reducing the uncertainty in X2 towards reducing the SR uncertainty. 
In comparison, the overall shift (the blue bars and green bars) in the two cases are the same, and this is why 
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the GSA measures, 
i and IHi that consider overall uncertainty of the system, are unable to distinguish the 
two input parameters. This example also indicates that the 'M1i  measure may not be appropriate to assess 
SR uncertainty. 
  
4.2. Example 2: two components in series 
The previous example is extended to a system with two components in series shown in Fig. 8.  
 
 
Fig.8 System with two components in series. 
 
Assume the failure probability of the two components are 
1 11X  and 2 11X , respectively. Hence, the 
failure probability of the system is  
 1 2 1 2
11 121
X X X X
Y

   (17) 
Using the same parameter distribution as in Table 2, the results are shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5 Uncertainty importance measures and their ranking (bracketed, “E” refers to equal ranking). 
 
 
Table 5 shows that M1i, M2i and M3i give the same ranking for the two parameters, that the uncertainty 
in X1 is more influential on the SR uncertainty than that in X2 is. GSA measures give the opposite 
conclusion by considering the overall system uncertainty. Again, 'M1i  still cannot distinguish X1 and X2 in 
this example, because we observed that  | iY Y XS E S . The importance of X1 on SR uncertainty, in 
comparison with X2, was also verified (detailed not reported here) by reducing the input uncertainty and 
observing the change of unsafety probability, similar to the method presented for Example 1. 
 
4.3. Example 3: two out of three (2oo3) system 
In this example, a more practical system with a 2oo3 (two-out-of-three) architecture, which is widely 
used in industry, is considered [20]: 
 
      
     
  
2
1 1
1
2
33 1 1
1 2 6
3 1
PFD D D
D D D D
D D D D D D
TY T DC MTTR
DC T MTTR DC
DC MTTR DC MTTR
 
  
   
   
   
  
 (18) 
Table 6 and the values are within the recommend ranges of IEC 61508 standard. The proof-test interval 
T1 can be fixed to one year according to [14]. The other parameters are assumed to follow the conventional 
lognormal distribution [11], whose mean and variance can be obtained by converting the range in Table 6 
(See Appendix A for detail). Subsequently, MC simulation is used to calculate the output distribution and 
the importance measures. The mean of the output distribution,  
PFDY
f y , is 5.6×10
-4
. based on which we 
assume that the safety system requires SIL-3. The results of the five measures are shown in Table 7. 
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Table 6 The parameters used in the 2oo3 model. 
 
 
Table 7 Uncertainty importance measures and their ranking. 
 
 
Table 7 shows that M1i, M2i, M3i and IHi (hereafter the “four measures”) give the same ranking. 
D ranks 1st for all the measures except 
'M1i .  ranks 2nd according to the “four measures” while it ranks 
3rd according to 
i  and 
'M1i . DDC  ranks 3rd according to the “four measures” while it ranks 2nd based on 
i  and 1st based on  
'M1i .  For all the measures, MTTR ranks 4th and D ranks 5th, and their values are far 
less than the values of other parameters. Hence, the effect on both overall and SR uncertainty due to 
uncertainty of MTTR and 
D  is negligible. In the view of the most important parameter, the rank given by 
'M1i  is very different from those given by other measures. It appears that 
'M1i  can only identify the group 
of the most influential parameters ( DDC , D and  ), but it cannot distinguish them in detail. As a result, 
'M1i  is not recommended to measure SR uncertainty.  
Above discussion also shows that the proposed methods (expect 'M1i ) and the two GSA measures give 
similar results, though they focus on different aspects of system uncertainty. This is because the effect of 
parameter uncertainty with regard to overall uncertainty and SR uncertainty is similar in the example. 
To further illustrate the importance of SR uncertainty, the probability distributions of two parameters,   
and DDC , are modified to beta distribution with the following density functions: 
    ,2,16f x Beta x   (19) 
    ,1.2,1.8
DDC
f x Beta x  (20) 
which are heavily skewed when compared with the original log-normal distribution. By keeping all other 
settings unchanged, the results are given in Table 8. 
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Table 8 Uncertainty importance measures and their ranking (   and DDC  are changed to conform to beta 
distributions). 
  
 
Table 8 shows that the ranking given by the proposed methods and the two GSA measures are different 
with regard to the most and least important parameters. 
DDC ranks 1st according to M1i and M2i, while it 
ranks 2nd based on 
i and 3rd by using IHi, 
'M1i  and M3i. D ranks 2nd according to M2i, 
'M1i and M3i 
while it ranks 1st based on 
i and IHi, and 3rd based on M1i.  ranks 3rd by i and M2i while it ranks 2nd 
according to IHi and M1i, and 1st based on M3i. All the proposed SR uncertainty measures agree that MTTR 
is the least important while the two GSA methods give 
D  the lowest rank. 
It should be noted that the SR measures do not always agree with each other in terms of the exact 
ranking of parameters. This phenomenon is not surprising since these SR measures are defined from 
different perspectives. In practice, the most appropriate SR uncertainty measure is likely to depend on 
specific applications and thus should be carefully selected. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Traditionally, quantitative risk assessment has been focused on investigating how the uncertainty of 
input parameters affects that of system output in an overall sense. This paper introduces the concept of 
safety-related uncertainty and highlights its relevance for the analysis of safety systems. The conventional 
GSA that provides information about the overall uncertainty is inappropriate to measure SR uncertainty. 
Therefore, four new methods are developed in this paper to quantify and rank the impact of individual 
parameters on SR uncertainty, and they are demonstrated through the application to three examples. In the 
first two examples, the proposed SR uncertainty measures correctly rank the parameters with regard to 
achieved safety, while the GSA measures either are unable to distinguish the importance of the two 
parameters (example 1), or give the opposite conclusion by considering the overall uncertainty (example 2). 
In the third example, the proposed methods and GSA measures obtain inconsistent results in particular 
regarding the most and least important parameters when the distributions of   and DDC  are heavily 
skewed. The results indicate the need of the proposed measures when SR uncertainty is considered. 
Nevertheless, the measure 'M1i  appears to be incapable of assessing the parameters’ importance 
appropriately in the studied examples.  
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Appendix A. Converting data into lognormal distribution 
In practice, data are often given in the form of a triplet (minimum, typical, maximum), duple (minimum, 
maximum), or even a point estimate [11]. Probabilistic analysis requires to convert such data into a certain 
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distribution with required characteristics. This appendix explains how to convert data into lognormal 
distribution based on the results in [11].  
The density function of lognormal distribution is given by: 
       
2
02
1 1
exp ln ln
22
f x x x
x  
 
   
 
 (A.1) 
The median of the lognormal distribution is x0. The problem now is how to choose the parameters   and x0. 
First, we discuss the form of triplet. Let m, T and M denote the minimum, typical and maximum values, 
respectively. In this case, m is defined by dividing the typical value by a certain factor F (m=T/F) and M is 
given by multiplying the typical value with the same factor (M = T × F). The following method can be used 
to determine   and x0. 
1). Choose x0 equal to the typical value T. 
2). Choose   in such a way that the probability for obtaining values between the minimum and the 
maximum is given by P (In  Example 3 of this paper, P is taken as 0.95). This implies that   is chosen so 
that : 
     
2
02
1 1
exp ln ln
22
M
m
P x x dx
x  
 
   
 
  (A.2) 
Define the auxiliary variable z as  
 
1
ln
2
x
z
T
 
  
 
 (A.3) 
In addition, the definition of the Gaussian error function is 
    2
0
2
exp
x
erf x t dt

   (A.4) 
From Eqs. (A.2)(A.3)(A.4) we have 
  
1
ln
2
P erf F

 
  
 
 (A.5) 
Now   can be calculated with the help of the inverse function of the error function 
 
 
 
ln
2
F
inverf P
   (A.6) 
The error function and its inverse function are available in many computation software packages, e.g. 
Matlab. 
If the form of duple (minimum, maximum) is given, a similar approach can be followed by using 
 
M
T mM and F
m
   (A.7) 
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